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Suit Against a State.
A suit by a citizen of California to enjoin the persons constituting
the board of land commissioners of the State of Oregon from selling
certain swamp lands claimed by the plaintiff, as forfeited to the State for
non-compliance with a condition of a former sale of the same lands by
the State to the plaintiff's grantor, is not a suit against the State of
Oregon within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States; it appearing that the legislature under which
the defendants claim the right to act is unconstitutional and void, because
it imlairs the obligation of the contract of the State with such grantor.
The cases reviewed, in which suits at law or in equity against officials
of a State, brought without permission of the State, have been held to be
either suits against the State, and, therefore, brought in violation of the
Eleventh Amendment; or, on the other hand, suits against persons who
hold office under the State for illegal acts done bj' them in performance
of their duty as servants of the State, under color of an- unconstitutional
law of the State, and therefore not suits against the State, but against
the officials as wrong-doers.
The Act of the Legislattire of Oregon of February i6, 1887, declaring
all certificates of stale of swamp or overflowed lands void on which 20 per
cent, of the purchase price was not paid prior to January 17, 1879, and
requiring the board of commissioners to cancel such certificates, impaired
the contract made by the State with the defendant in error under the Act
of October 26,'1870, so that Act and the Act of January 17, 1879, are con-
strued by the Court, and was, therefore, violation of Article I, Section io
of the Constitution of the United States.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Apifealfrom the Circuit Court of the United States/or
the District of Oregon.
This was a suit in equity by the appellee, a citizen of
California, against the appellants, who, by virtue of the
I Reported in 14o U. S. Reps., I.
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Constitution of Oregon, as Governor, Secretary of State and
State Treasurer comprised the board of land commis-
sioners of that State, to restrain and enjoin them from sell-
ing and conveying a large amount of land in that State to
which the appellee asserted title.
There was a demurrer to the bill, on the ground that
the suit was practically against the State, and was, there-
fore, prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The demurrer was overruled in the
Circuit Court (see 43 Fed. Rep., pp. 339 and 196), and a
decree entered perpetually enjoining the defendants from
selling the lands in question. An appeal from the decree
brought the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the decision of the Circuit Court was sustained.
SUIT AGAINST A STATE.
The exemption of a member of
the Union from suit is, by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, ex-
tended to all attempts of citizens of
another State, or citizens or sub-
jects of any foreign State, to fetch
the State into or under the judicial
power of any Federal Court in the
land. The article is silent as to the
suability of a State by its own
citizens, yet such an action has been
generally regarded as included in
the two classes of suits forbidden by
the Constitution: Poindexter v.
Greenhow, 114 U. S., 270 (1884);
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S., 711
(1882).
Alexander Hamilton (8ist Fed-
eralist) treated the possibility of a
State being sued in the United
States Courts by one of her own
citizens as too remote and chimeri-
cal for consideration. Yet as early
as 1792 the United States Supreme
Court enteredjudgment for a citizen
against a State: Chisholm v. Geor-
gia, 2 Dall., 419.
It might be said that this decision
was the cause of the Eleventh
Amendment, which was proposed
in Congress in 1794, and ratified by
the States in 1798. So great was
the judicial revulsion produced by
this Amendment that in one case
stated the Court forthwith ordered
struck from the docket all pending
suits against a State, delivering, on
the day succeeding the argument,
a unanimous opinion that the
Amendment, being constitutionally
adopted, there could not be exer-
cised any jurisdiction in any case,
past or future, or then pending, in
which a State was sued by a citizen
of another State, or by the citizens
or subjects of any foreign State:
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall.,
378, 382 (1798).
Another party plaintiff was sug-
gested in a subsequent case-the
government of the United States.
A creation of the supreme power
sued a State through its officer, and
it was acknowledged that there was
no provision in the Constitution
preventing the United States from
suing a State: Osborn v. The Bank,
9 Wheat., 738 (1824); U. S. v. Texas,
143 U. S., 621 (1891).
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There are two lines of cases bear-
ing upon the whole question in the
reported decisions of the United
States Supreme Court-one line
which tends to restrict the rights of
courts to act upon State officers for
the enforcement of duties and ob-
ligations of the State toward pri-
vate parties; another line, which
tends to maintain such right and to
enforce it somewhat broadly and
fully. They are marked in general
by the distinction of strict and
liberal construction which has pre-
vailed so extensively and steadily
in our judicial and political history
-a distinction which is natural and
inevitable, arising from the trend of
events and the constitution of the
human mind.
Under the first line of cases-i. e.,
those which delimit or restric.t the
boundaries of judicial process for
the protection of abstract rights
invoked on behalf of private claim-
ants, two propositions may be laid -
down:
(i) That when positive affirma-
tive relief is sought, by the enforce-
ment, through judicial process, of a
State's contracts, although the
State's officers only are the defend-
ants, the suit is in substance a suit
against the State, and barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. -
(2) That when the relief sought
goes to the extent of requiring the
courts to virtually assume control
and administration of a part of the
executive functions of a State gov-
ernment, the suit is not only in
substance against the State, but it
calls for a usurpation by the Courts
of the functions of the political
sovereign: Louisiana v. Jumel,
supra; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107
U. S., 769 (1882).
So, in thelatter case, a mandamus
against a State officer to compel
him to receive in payment of taxes
certain coupons, at first legal, then
repudiated by the State, was refused.
That decision immediately followed
Louisiana v. Jumel in the order of
time, and showed conclusively that
there was no remedy against a State
itself on account of an impairment
of a contract, and that a suit to
compel State officers to do acts
which constitute a performance of
its contract, is a suit against a State
itself, and not tenable.
The question of the suability of
a State really involves the construc-
tion and validity of State legisla-
tion. If the law under which a
defendant assumes to act is void,
then he does not represent the
State. He is acting without the
authority of law, without the au-
thority of the State, and hence is
as responsible for his acts as a
private individual. If the legisla-
tion is valid he represents the State,
and the suit, in substance and effect,
is against the State, and forbidden:
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S, 52 -
(1885).
While a State cannot be com-
pelled by suit to perform its con-
tracts, any attempt on its part to
violate property or rights acquired
under its contracts may be judicially
resisted, and any law impairing the
obligation of a contract under
which such property or rights are
held, is void and powerless to effect
their enjoyment: Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 134 U. S., i (1889).
The immunity from suit secured
to the States is undoubtedly a part
of the Constitution, of equal au-
tbority with every other, but .no
greater, and to be construed and
applied in harmony with all the
provisions of that instrument.
That immunity, however, does not
exempt a State from the operation
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of the constitutional provision that
no State shall pass a law impairing
the obligation of a contract, etc.
No remedy for a breach of its con-
tract by a State, by way of damage
or compensation, no affirmative
relief, directed boldly against a
State as a member of the Union, or
by way of process to compel its
performance, is open, in the courts
of the United States, -by a direct
suit against the State itself, on the
part of the injured party being a
citizen of another State, or a citizen
or subject of a foreign State. But
it is equally true that whenever, in
a controversy between parties to a
suit, of which the Supreme Court
of the United States has jurisdic-
tion, the question arises upon the
'validity of a law by a State under
and in comparison with the supreme
law of the* United States, the juris-
diction is not thereby ousted, but
must be exercised to the rights of
the litigants: Fletcher v. Beck, 6
Cranch., 87; Poindexter v. Green-
how, supra; New Jersey v. Wilson,
7 Cranch, 164; Wolf v. New Or-
leans, 1o3 U. S., 358 (i88o); Green
z. Biddle, 8 Wheat., x.
And the construction given to a
statute by the executive or adminis-
trative officers of a government
charged with its execution is en-
titled to respectful consideration,
and ought not to be lightly over-
ruled: United States v. Moore; 95
U. S., 763; Scarlan v. Childs, 33
Wis., 666; Edwards v. Darby, 12
Wheat., 210; Westbrook v. Miller,
56 Mich., i51.
If Pennoyer v. McConnaughey
were a suit to compel the specific
performance of so much of that con-
tract as remains unperformed by
the State, that is, the execution by
the defendants of a conveyance of
the land to plaintiff, it would be a
suit against the State, although not
so named in the record. A decree
for the plaintiff in such a case would
require the defendants to do and
perform an act which they could
only do as the agents and repre-
sentatives of the State, and, there-
fore, the court would be without
jurisdiction. See remarks of DBADY,
J., in 43 Fed. Rep., 341.
A defendant sued as a wrong-
doer, who seeks to substitute the
State in his place, or to justify by
the authority of the State, or to de-
fend on the ground that the State
has adopted his act and exonerated
him, cannot rest on the bare as-
sumption of his defense. He is
bound to establish it. Priinafacie,
therefore, a naked authority from
a State is void and unrecognizable
in the Federal Courts: Bates z.
Clark, 95 U. S., 204 (1877); Mitchell
v. Harmony, 13 How., 11S; Meigs
v. McClung, 9 Cranch., xi; Wilcox
v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 493; Brown v.
Huger, 21 How., 3o5; Grisar v.
McDowell, 6 Wall., 363; United
States vz. Lee, io6 U. S., 196.
The State is a political body; it
can act only through agents, and
can command only by laws. It is
necessary for a defendant State
officer, in order to complete his de-
fense, to produce a law of the State
which constitutes his commission
as its agent and a warrant for his
act. If the law is in conflict with
the Constitution of the United
States it is no law, and the officer
stands stripped of his authority
and confessing a personal violation
of a citizen's rights.
In the discussion of the question
the distinction between thegovew-
inent of a State and the State itself
is important, and should be ob-
served. In common apprehension
and speech they are usually re-
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garded as identical, and as oixli-
narily the acts of the government
are the acts of the State, because
.within the limits of its delegation
of power the government of the
State is generally confounded with
the State itself, and often the for-
mer is meant'when the latter is
mentioned. The State itself is an
ideal person-intangible, invisible,
immutable. L'etat c'est Moi, is a
personal application not pertinent
to a member of our Union. The
government is an agent, and within
the sphere of its agency a perfect
representative, but outside of that
agency it is a lawless usurpation.
The Constitution of the United
States is the limit of the authority
of the government, and both gov-
ernment and State are subject to
the supremacy of the Constitution
and of the laws made in pursuance
thereof. That which is unlawful
because made so by the supreme
law, the Constitution of the United
States, is not the word or deed of
the State, but is the mere wrong
and' trespass of those individual
persons who falsely speak and act
in its name. The king can do no
wrong. This distinction is essen-
tial to the idea of constitutional
government.
"Of what avail," asks Ir. Jus-
tice MATTHBWS, in Poindexter v.
Greenhow, sup ra, "are written
constitutions whose bills .6f right
for the security of individual liberty
have been written too often with
the blood of martyrs shed upon
the battlefield and the scaffold if
their limitations and restraints upon
power may be overpassed with im-
punity by the very agencies created
and appointed to guard, defend and
enforce them; and that, too, with
the sacred authority of law., not
only compelling obedience, but en-
titled to reppect! And how else
can these principles of individual
liberty and right be maintained if,
when violated, thejudicial tribunals
are forbidden to visit penalties upon
individual offenders who are the
instruments of wrong when they
interpose the shield of the State?
The doctrine is not to be tolerated.
The whole frame and schemeofthe
political institutions of this coun-
try, State and Federal, protest
against it. Their continued exist-
ence is not compatible with it It
is the doctrine of absolutism, pure
and simple and naked, and of com-
munism, which is its twin-the
double progeny of the same evil
birth."
So, when an individual defend-
ant pleads a statute of a State
which is in violation of the Consti-
tution of the United States as his
authority for taking or holding
property to which a citizen asserts
.title, to say the enforcement of the
supreme law of the land is to co-
erce the State, ignores the funda-
mental principle on which the Con-
stitution rests, and practically re-
verses the positions of the -State
and United States laws. If the
State sues its servant for neglect of
duty and disobedience to its com-
mands, he may defend success-
fully by putting in the judicial in-
terpretation of the part of the law
as given by the Supreme Court of
the country. It is no objection to
the remedy in such cases that the
statute whose application in the
particular case is sought to be
restrained is not void on its face,
but is complained of only because
its operation in the -particular in-
stance works a violation of a con-
stitutional right, for the cases are
numerous where the tax laws of a
State, which in their general and
SUIT AGAINST A STATE.
proper application are perfectly
valid, have been held to become
void in particular cases, either as
unconstitutional regulations of
commerce, or as violations of con-
tracts under the Constitution, or
because in some way they operate
to deprive the party complaining
of a right secured to him by the
Constitution of the United States:
Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v. Mil-
ler, 114 U. S., 176 (1884); State of
Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How., 369 (1853);
Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black., 436; Trust
Co. v. Debolt, 16 How., 432 (1853);
Bank v. Debolt, I8 How., 380
(1855); Woodruff v. Trapnell, io
How., 190 (i85o).
Suits against a State's officers
are usually brought for the follow-
ing causes: That the acts com-
plained of prevent the proper ex-
ercise of a franchise secured to a
citizen by certain *unchangeable
charter rights to avoid a multipli-
city of suits; the want of adequate
remedies at law-the usual aver-
ment to give a court of equity
jurisdiction; to remove a cloud
upon a title; or to protect a citizen
from an attempted violation of an
obligation of a contract: Tomlin-
son v. Branch, 15 Wall., 46o (1872);
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 43 Fed.
Rep., 339; In re Ayers, 123 U. S.,
443 (1887); Allen v. Balt. & Ohio
R. R, 114 U. S., 311; McGahey v.
Virginia, 135 U. S., 662. The tests
by which a suit is determined to be
one against a State may be classi-
fied as follows:
(i) Whether a State is named as
a party to the record.
(2) Whetherthe action is directly
upon the contract.
(3) Whether the suit was brought
to control the discretion of an ex-
ecutive officer of a State.
(4) Whether the suit was brought
II
for the purpose of administering
the funds actually in the public
treasury.
(5) Whether it is an attempt to
compel officers of the State to do
acts which constitute a perform-
ance of its contracts by a State.
(6) Where the case is such that
the State is a necessary party that
the defendant may be protected
from liability to it.
The Supreme Court of the United
States has repeatedly, since Osborn
v. The Bank, and Davis v. Gray (16
Wall., 203), overruled the dictum in
those cases, that "the Eleventh
Amendment, which restrains the
jurisdiction granted by the Consti-
tution over suits against the State,
is of necessity limited to those suits
in which a State is a party on the
record. This announcement has
been frequently disregarded,'and is
now no longer the law: Decatur v.
Paulding, 14 Pet., 497; Woodruff v.
Trapnell, io How., 19o; Curran v.
Arkansas, I5 How., 3o4; Litchfield
v. Register, 9 Wall., 575; Secretary
v. McGarrahan, 9 Id., 298.
In Osborn v. The Bank of the
United States, the interest of the
State was direct and immediate, not
consequential. The process of the
Court, though not directed against
the State by name, acted directly
upon it by restraining its officers.
"A denial ofjurisdiction forbids all
inquiry into the nature of the case.
It applies to cases perfectly clear
in themselves; to the cases where
.the Government is in the exercise
of its best-established and most es-
sential powers, as well as to those
which may bedeemed questionable,
It asserts that the agents of a State,
alleging the authority of a law void
in itself because repugnant to the
Constitution, may arrest the execu-
tion of any law in the United States,
'49
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It maintains that if a State shall
impose a fine or penalty on any
person employed in the execution
of any law of the United States, it
may levy that fine or penalty by a
ministerial officer without the sanc-
tion even of its own cot-ts, and that
the individual, although he per-
ceives the approaching danger, can
obtain no protection from the judi-
cial department of the Govern-
ment. Do the provisions of the
American Constitution respecting
controversies to which a State may
be a party extend, on a fair con-
struction of that instrument, to
cases in which the State is not a
party on the record "
Chief Justice MARSHALL (p. 351)
answered that questiqn in the neg-
ative, adding that no English case
could be adduced where any person
has been considered as a party who
was not made so on the record. In
Davis v. Gray, decided in 1872,
these principles were re-affirmed,
and no distinction was made be-
tween the governor of a State and
officers of lower grades. As parties
in such a suit they are upon an
equality: Whitman v. The Gov-
ernor, 5 Ohio St., 528.
In a case where the action was
not in the name of a State, but was
brought against the governor in its
behalf, it was said by Chief Justice
MARSHALL again that that official
was sued not by his name, but by
his title. The demand upon him
was not made personally, but offi-
cially. "In such a case where the
chief magistrate is sued, not by his
name, but by his style of office, and
the claim made upon him is entirely
in his official character, we think
the State itself may be considered
as a party on the record." Thus
modifying somewhat his former
vicks: Georgia v. Brailsford, 2
Dall., 402; see, also, Ex fiarle Juan
Madrazzo, 7 Pet., 627; Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How., 66, 98; Missis-
sippi v. Johnson, 4 WalI., 475.
So the question whether a suit is
within the prohibition is not always
determined by reference to the nom-
inal parties on the record, and the
Court will look behind it. The pro-
vision is to be broadly applied in
furtherance of its intention, and
not to be evaded by technical and
trivial subtleties: New York v.
Louisiana, io8 U. S., 76 (1882),-.
Cunningham v. R. P., io9 Id.,
446; Kaukauna Co. v. Greeh Bay,
&c., Canal, 142 U. S., 269 (i891).
It is not possible for one State to
evade the prohibition of the Elev-
enth Amendment by assuming the
claims of a citizen against another
State when no interest of its own
is concerned. Under the Constitu-
tion as originally construed, a citi-
zen of one State could sue another
State in the courts of the United
States for himself, and obtain the
same relief the State could get for
him if it should sue. "Certainly,
when he can sue for himself there
is no necessity for power to sue in
his behalf, and we cannot believe it
was the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to allow both rem-
edies in such a case. Therefore,
the special remedy granted to the
citizen himself must be deemed to
have been the only remedy the cit-
izen of one State could have under
the Constitution against, another
State for the redress of his griev-
ance, except such as the delinquent
State saw fit itself to grant. In
other words, the giving of the direct
remedy to the citizen himself was
equivalent to taking away any indi-
rect remedy he might otherwise
have claimed through the interven-
tion of his State upon any principle
SUIT AGAINST A STATE.
of the law of nations." It follows
thatwhen the Eleventh Amendment
took away the special remedy at
the instance of the harassed States
there was no other left. Nothing
was added to the Constitution by
what was then done, and no power
taken away by the grant of the spe-
cial remedy was restored by the
Amendment: New York v. Louis-
iana (supra).
In this case there was upon the
face of the record nominally a
controversy between two States,
but upon an examination of the
pleadings it appeared that one State
was suing not for its own interest,
but on behalf of certain individual
citizens thereof.
Its own citizens are upon the
same plane as are those of another
State. The -Eleventh Amendment
does not in terms .prohibit such
suits; "but the evident reason of this
is that the judicial power was not
granted to the United States by the
original Constitution in such cases;
hence, as it was not granted, it was
not deemed necessary to prohibit
it. It was evidently supposed that
the control of all litigation against
a State by its own citizens was in
its own power, among that mass of
rights which was reserved to the
States and the people. It would
be very strange to say that, al-
though a State cannot, in any case,
be sued by a citizen of another
State since the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment, yet in a case
arising under the Laws and Con-
stitution of the United States it
may be sued by its own citizens:"
Dissenting opinion in Virginia
Coupon Cases, 1I4 U. S., 337 (1884),
A suit was brought in the Circuit
Court of the United States for this,
by a stockholder of a Cleveland
bank and a citizen of Connecticut
as well, against that bank, its man-
aging directors, and Dodge, tax
collector of the county in which
the bank was situated. The bill
alleged that Dodge had levied
upon property of the bank to make
a collection of tax which, by the
Constitution of Ohio, the bank was
bound to pay; that in this respect
the CoLstitution, then recently
adIopted, impaired the obligation
of the contract of the State with
the bank as contained in its charter.
As the law then stood, there was
no means by which the bank, be-
ing a citizen of the same State with
Dodge, could bring into a court of
the United States the right which
it asserted under the Constitution
to be relieved of the tax in ques-
tion, except by a writ of error from
a State Court to the National Su-
preme Court: Dodge v. Woolsey, iS
How., 33 1.
In a subsequent similar attempt,
the Supreme Court dismissed the
complainant's bill on the ground
that the parties thereto had been
improperly or collusively joined
for the purpose of creating a case
of which that court would take
cognizance: Hawes v. Oakland, lO4
U. S., 450 (i88i).
It certainly can never be alleged
that a mere suggestion of title in a
State to property in possession of
an individual must arrest the pro-
ceedings of the Court, and prevent
their looking into the suggestions
and examining the validity of the
title: U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch.,
115. Neither will the Court decide
an abstract question presented to it
in a bill in equity, with the avowed
object of obtaining a judiciar de-
claration that such and such
statutes are unconstitutional when
the complainant does not aver that
he is about to be, or has been, in-
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jured by their enforcement: Wil-
liams v. Hagood, 98 U. S., 72
(1878); Hagood v'. Southern, 117
U. S., 52 (1885).
Justice BRADLEY, in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Virginia Coupon
Cases (su ra) , says that in all cases
previous the Staite had attempted
to do some unconstitutional act in-
jurious to the party, of some act
which it had entered into a con-
tract not to do, and redress was
sought against such aggressive acts.
None of them exhibit the case of a
State declining to pay a debt or to
perform an obligation, and the
party seeking to enforce its per-
formance by judicial process (p.
336). "They are attempts to coerce
a State by a judicial process, and it
is useless to attempt to deceive our-
selves by an adroit use of words or
by a train of metaphysical reason-
ing: We do not remember that it
is anywhere contended that the
State can be sued by its own
citizens against its ow.n law, merely
because the Eleventh Amendment
does not in terms extend to that
case." Where the things required
by the decree to be done by a
State officer are the very things
which, when done or performed,
constitute a performance of the al-
leged contract by the State, the
suit is essentially against the State:
Hagood v. Southern (supra).
The converse of this proposition
must be equally true because it is
contained in it; that is, a bill the
object of which is by injunction
indirectly to compel the specific
performance of the contract, by for-
bidding all those acts which con-
stitute breaches of the contract,
must also necessarily be a suit
against a Stite: n re Ayers (su-
pra).
Although a defendaut is a State
officer, if a suit is to compel him to
do what a statute requires, or to re-
strain him from doing what a stat-
ute directs, when such statute is
seen to be unconstitutional, there
can be no objection to it on account
of the official character of defend-
ant: Ralston v. Fund Comm., 120
U. S., 390.
Undoubtedly a State can be sued
without its own consent: Curran v.
Arkansas el ai, 15 How., 3o4; Clark
v. Barnard, IoSU. S., 436, but it can
repeal a law at any time giving a
citizen permission to bring suit
against it, and such a law is not a
contract with the terms of the Con-
stitution. As the permission is en-
tirely voluntary on the part of the
sovereign,it follows that it may pre-
scribe the terms on which it con-
sents to be sued, and may withdraw
its consent whenever it may sup-
pose that justice to the public re-
quires it: Beers el al. v.- Arkansas,
2o How., 527; R. R. v. Tennessee,
101 U. S., 337; R. R. v. Alabama,
IOI U. S, 832; Louisiana v. Jumel,
107 Id., 71r.
Neitherwill the Court interfere
with a discretionary 'act of a State
official as distinguished from one
purely ministerial, nor will it com-
mand the withdrawal of money
from the treasury: U. S. ex rel.
Goodrich v. Guthrie, 17 How., 284
(1850) ; Litchfield v* Richards, 9
Wall., 575.
In a recent case the words "shall
not be continued," in the Amend-
ment, were adroitly used as an au-
thoritative interpretation of the
original Constitution, and a direct
and plain mandate forbidding any
judicial construction of the Amend-
ment in favor of entertaining any
suits against a State: In re Ayers,
123 U. S., 442.
It forbade, contended the peti-
